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Abstract
Crafting adversarial examples has become an important tech-
nique to evaluate the robustness of deep neural networks
(DNNs). However, most existing works focus on attacking
the image classification problem since its input space is con-
tinuous and output space is finite. In this paper, we study the
much more challenging problem of crafting adversarial ex-
amples for sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) models, whose
inputs are discrete text strings and outputs have an almost infi-
nite number of possibilities. To address the challenges caused
by the discrete input space, we propose a projected gradient
method combined with group lasso and gradient regulariza-
tion. To handle the almost infinite output space, we design
some novel loss functions to conduct non-overlapping attack
and targeted keyword attack. We apply our algorithm to ma-
chine translation and text summarization tasks, and verify
the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm: by changing less
than 3 words, we can make seq2seq model to produce de-
sired outputs with high success rates. We also use an external
sentiment classifier to verify the property of preserving se-
mantic meanings for our generated adversarial examples. On
the other hand, we recognize that, compared with the well-
evaluated CNN-based classifiers, seq2seq models are intrin-
sically more robust to adversarial attacks.
Introduction
Adversarial attack on deep neural networks (DNNs) aims
to slightly modify the inputs of DNNs and mislead
them to make wrong predictions (Szegedy et al. 2013;
Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014). This task has be-
come a common approach to evaluate the robustness of
DNNs – generally speaking, the easier an adversarial ex-
ample can be generated, the less robust the DNN model is.
However, models designed for different tasks are not born
equal: some tasks are strictly harder to attack than others.
For example, attacking an image is much easier than attack-
ing a text string, since image space is continuous and the
adversary can make arbitrarily small changes to the input.
Therefore, even if most of the pixels of an image have been
modified, the perturbations can still be imperceptible to hu-
mans when the accumulated distortion is small. In contrast,
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text strings live in a discrete space, and word-level manip-
ulations may significantly change the meaning of the text.
In this scenario, an adversary should change as few words
as possible, and hence this limitation induces a sparse con-
straint on word-level changes. Likewise, attacking a classi-
fier should also be much easier than attacking a model with
sequence outputs. This is because different from the classi-
fication problem that has a finite set of discrete class labels,
the output space of sequences may have an almost infinite
number of possibilities. If we treat each sequence as a la-
bel, a targeted attack needs to find a specific one over an
enormous number of possible labels, leading to a nearly zero
volume in search space. This may explain why most existing
works on adversarial attack focus on the image classification
task, since its input space is continuous and its output space
is finite.
In this paper, we study a harder problem of crafting
adversarial examples for sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq)
models (Sutskever, Vinyals, and Le 2014). This problem is
challenging since it combines both aforementioned diffi-
culties, i.e., discrete inputs and sequence outputs with an
almost infinite number of possibilities. We choose this
problem not only because it is challenging, but also be-
cause seq2seq models are widely used in many safety
and security sensitive applications, e.g., machine trans-
lation (Bahdanau, Cho, and Bengio 2014), text summariza-
tion (Rush, Chopra, and Weston 2015), and speech recogni-
tion (Chan et al. 2016), thus measuring its robustness be-
comes critical. Specifically, we aim to examine the following
questions in this study:
1. Is it possible to slightly modify the inputs of seq2seq mod-
els while significantly change their outputs?
2. Are seq2seq models more robust than the well-evaluated
CNN-based image classifiers?
We provide an affirmative answer to the first question by
developing an effective adversarial attack framework called
Seq2Sick. It is an optimization-based framework that aims
to learn an input sequence that is close enough to the orig-
inal sequence (in terms of distance metrics in word embed-
ding spaces or sentiment classification) while leads to the
desired outputs with high confidence. To address the chal-
lenges caused by the discrete input space, we propose to use
the projected gradient descent method combined with group
lasso and gradient regularization. To address the challenges
of almost infinite output space, we design some novel loss
functions for the tasks of non-overlapping attack and tar-
geted keyword attack. Our experimental results show that
the proposed framework yields high success rates in both
tasks. However, even if the proposed approach can success-
fully attack seq2seq models, our answer to the second ques-
tion is “Yes”. Compared with CNN-based classifiers that are
highly sensitive to adversarial examples, seq2seq model is
intrinsically more robust since it has discrete input space and
the output space is exponentially large. As a result, adver-
sarial examples of seq2seq models usually have larger dis-
tortions and are more perceptible than the adversarial ex-
amples crafted for CNN-based image classifiers. To the best
of our knowledge, this paper is the first work that evaluates
the robustness of seq2seq model, which has inspired many
follow-up works and has been cited since its debut.
Related work and Background
Papernot et al.(2016) first uses Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) to conduct an attack on RNN/LSTM-based
classification problems. In order to generate text ad-
versarial examples, Li, Monroe, and Jurafsky(2016) pro-
poses to use reinforcement learning to locate important
words that could be deleted in sentiment classification.
Samanta and Mehta(2017) and Liang et al.(2017) generate
adversarial sequences by inserting or replacing existing
words with typos and synonyms. Gao et al.(2018) aims to
attack sentiment classification models in a black-box setting.
It develops some scoring functions to find the most impor-
tant words to modify. Yang et al.(2018) applied a greedy ap-
proach and a Gumbel trick to speed up the inference time.
Alzantot et al.(2018) proposed a genetic algorithm to at-
tack sentiment analysis. These approaches differ from our
method in that they study simple text classification prob-
lems while we focus on the more challenging seq2seq model
with sequential outputs. Other than attacking text classi-
fiers, Jia and Liang(2017) aims to fool reading comprehen-
sion systems by adding misleading sentences, which has a
different focus than ours. Zhao, Dua, and Singh(2017) uses
the generative adversarial network (GAN) to craft natural
adversarial examples. However, it can only perform the un-
targeted attack and also suffers from high computational
cost.
Notably, almost all the previous methods are based on
greedy search, i.e., at each step, they search for the best
word and the best position to replace the previous word.
As a result, their search space grows rapidly as the length
of input sequence increases. To address this issue, we pro-
pose a novel approach that uses group lasso regulariza-
tion and the projected gradient descent method with gradi-
ent regularization to simultaneously search all the replace-
ment positions. Table 1 summarizes the key differences be-
tween the proposed framework Seq2Sick and the existing
attack methods on RNN-based models. Note that our pa-
per was the first method for attacking seq2seq model on
arXiv and after our work, there are some followup papers
such as (Michel et al. 2019), where they use several similar-
ity metrics to conduct the attack while our work are focusing
on the BLEU score and self-defined loss functions.
Before introducing the proposed algorithms, we first
briefly describe the sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) model.
Let xi ∈ R
d be the embedding vector of each input word,
N be the input sequence length, and M be the output se-
quence length. Let ω be the input vocabulary, and the out-
put word yj ∈ ν where ν is the output vocabulary. The
seq2seq model has an encoder-decoder framework that aims
at mapping an input sequence of vectorsX = (x1, . . . ,xN )
to the output sequence Y = {y1, . . . ,yM}. Its encoder
first reads the input sequence, then each RNN/LSTM cell
computes ht = f(xt, ht−1), where xt is the current
input, ht−1 and ht represent the previous and current
cells’ hidden states, respectively. The next step computes
the context vector c using all the hidden layers of cells
h1, . . . ,hN , i.e c = q(h1, · · · ,hN ), where q(·) could be
a linear or non-linear function. In this paper, we follow
the setting in (Sutskever, Vinyals, and Le 2014) that c =
q(h1, · · · ,hN) = hN .
Given the context vector c and all the previously words
{y1, . . . ,yt−1}, the decoder is trained to predict the next
word yt. Specifically, the t-th cell in the decoder receives
its previous cell’s output yt−1 and the context vector c, and
then outputs
zt = g(yt−1, c) and pt = softmax(zt), (1)
where g is another RNN/LSTM cell function. zt :=
[z
(1)
t , z
(2)
t , . . . , z
(|ν|)
t ] ∈ R
|ν| is a vector of the logits for each
possible word in the output vocabulary ν.
Seq2Sick: Proposed Framework
Crafting adversarial examples against the seq2seqmodel can
be formulated as an optimization problem:
minδ L(X+ δ) + λ · R(δ), (2)
where R(·) indicates the regularization function to measure
the magnitude of distortions. L(·) is the loss function to
penalize the unsuccessful attack and it may take different
forms in different attack scenarios. A common choice for
R(δ) is the ℓ2 penalty‖δ‖
2
2, but it is, as we will show later,
not suitable for attacking seq2seq model. λ > 0 is the reg-
ularization parameter that balances the distortion and attack
success rate – a smaller λ will make the attack more likely
to succeed but with the price of larger distortion.
In this work, we focus on two kinds of attacks: non-
overlapping attack and targeted keywords attack. The first
attack requires that the output of the adversarial exam-
ple shares no overlapping words with the original out-
put. This task is strictly harder than untargeted attack,
which only requires that the adversarial output to be dif-
ferent from the original output (Zhao, Dua, and Singh 2017;
Ebrahimi et al. 2017). We ignore the task of untargeted at-
tack since it is trivial for the proposed framework, which
can easily achieve a 100% attack success rate, while
Ebrahimi et al.(2017) could achieve 76.24% attack success
rate for text summarization and 98.8% success rate for ma-
chine translation with 1 word change. Targeted keywords at-
tack is an even more challenging task than non-overlapping
Table 1: Summary of existing works that are designed to attack RNN models. “BINARY” indicates the attack is for binary
classifications, and there is no difference between untargeted and targeted attack in this case. “CLASS” means targeted attack to
a specific class. “KEYWORD” means targeted attack to a specific keyword. Here we omit follow-up works based on Seq2Sick.
Methods Gradient Based? Word-level RNN? Sequential Output? Targeted Attack?
Ebrahimi et al.(2017)
√ × √ Class
Jia and Liang(2017) × √ × ×
Li, Monroe, and Jurafsky(2016)
√ √ × Class
Papernot et al.(2016)
√ × √ ×
Gao et al.(2018) × √ × Binary
Samanta and Mehta(2017) × × × Binary
Zhao, Dua, and Singh(2017) /
√ √
Class
Liang et al.(2017)
√ × × Class
Alzantot et al.(2018) × √ × Class
Yang et al.(2018) × √ × Class
Seq2Sick (Ours)
√ √ √
Keyword
attack. Given a set of targeted keywords, the goal of targeted
keywords attack is to find an adversarial input sequence
such that all the keywords must appear in its correspond-
ing output. In the following, we respectively introduce the
loss functions developed for the two attack approaches.
Non-overlapping Attack To formally define the non-
overlapping attack, we let s = {s1, . . . , sM} be the original
output sequence, where si denotes the location of the i-th
word in the output vocabulary ν. {z1, . . . , zM} indicates the
logit layer outputs of the adversarial example. In the non-
overlapping attack, the output of adversarial example should
be entirely different from the original output S, i.e.,
st 6= argmaxy∈ν z
(y)
t , ∀t = 1, . . . ,M,
which is equivalent to
z
(st)
t < maxy∈ν, y 6=st z
(y)
t , ∀t = 1, . . . ,M.
Given this observation, we can define a hinge-like loss
function L to generate adversarial examples in the non-
overlapping attack, i.e.,
Lnon-overlapping =
∑M
t=1
max{−ǫ, z
(st)
t −max
y 6=st
{z
(y)
t }}, (3)
where ǫ ≥ 0 denotes the confidence margin parameter. Gen-
erally speaking, a larger ǫ will lead to a more confident out-
put and a higher success rate, but with the cost of more iter-
ations and longer running time.
We note that non-overlapping attack is much more
challenging than untargeted attack, which suffices to
find a one-word difference from the original out-
put (Zhao, Dua, and Singh 2017; Ebrahimi et al. 2017). We
do not take untargeted attack into account since it is straight-
forward and the replaced words could be some less impor-
tant words such as “the” and “a”.
Targeted Keywords Attack Given a set of targeted key-
words, the goal of targeted keywords attack is to generate
an adversarial input sequence to ensure that all the targeted
keywords appear in the output sequence. This task is impor-
tant since it suggests adding a few malicious keywords can
completely change the meaning of the output sequence. For
example, in English to German translation, an input sentence
“policeman helps protesters to keep the assembly in order”
should generate an output sentence “Polizist hilft Demon-
stranten, die Versammlung in Ordnung zu halten”. However,
changing only one word from “hilft” to “verhaftet” in the
output will significantly change its meaning, as the new sen-
tence means “police officer arrested protesters to keep the
assembly in order”.
In our method, we do not specify the positions of the tar-
geted keywords in the output sentence. Instead, it is more
natural to design a loss function that allows the targeted key-
words to become the top-1 prediction at any positions. The
attack is considered as successful only when ALL the tar-
geted keywords appear in the output sequence. Therefore,
the more targeted keywords there are, the harder the attack
is. To illustrate our method, we start from the simpler case
with only one targeted keyword k1. To ensure that the tar-
get keyword word’s logit z
(k1)
t be the largest among all the
words at a position t, we design the following loss function:
L = min
t∈[M ]
{max{−ǫ, max
y 6=k1
{z
(y)
t } − z
(k1)
t }}, (4)
which essentially searches the minimum of the hinge-
like loss terms over all the possible locations t ∈ [M ].
When there exist more than one targeted keywords K =
{k1, k2, . . . , k|K|}, where ki denotes the i-th word in out-
put vocabulary ν, we follow the same idea to define the loss
function as follows:
Lkeywords =
|K|∑
i=1
min
t∈[M ]
{max{−ǫ,max
y 6=ki
{z
(y)
t }− z
(ki)
t }}. (5)
However, the loss defined in (5) suffers from the “keyword
collision” problem. When there are more than one keyword,
it is possible that multiple keywords compete at the same
position to attack. To address this issue, we define a mask
function m to mask off the position if it has been already
occupied by one of the targeted keywords:
mt(x) =
{
+∞ if argmaxi∈ν z
(i)
t ∈ K
x otherwise
(6)
In other words, if any of the keywords appear at position t
as the top-1 word, we ignore that position and only consider
other positions for the placement of remaining keywords. By
incorporating the mask function, the final loss for targeted
keyword attack becomes:
|K|∑
i=1
min
t∈[M ]
{mt(max{−ǫ, max
y 6=ki
{z
(y)
t } − z
(ki)
t })}. (7)
Handling Discrete Input Space
As mentioned before, the problem of “discrete input space”
is one of the major challenges in attacking seq2seq model.
LetW be the set of word embeddings of all words in the in-
put vocabulary. A naive approach is to first learn X + δ∗
in the continuous space by solving the problem (2), and
then search for its nearest word embedding in W. This idea
has been used in attacking sequence classification models
in Gong et al.(2018). Unfortunately, when applying this idea
to targeted keywords attack, we report that all of the 100 at-
tacked sequences on Gigaword dataset failed to generate the
targeted keywords. The main reason is that by directly solv-
ing (2), the final solution will not be a feasible word embed-
ding in W, and its nearest neighbor could be far away from
it due to the curse of dimensionality (Friedman 1997).
To address this issue, we propose to add an additional con-
straint to enforce thatX+ δ belongs to the input vocabulary
W. The optimization problem then becomes
min
δ
L(X+ δ) + λ ·R(δ)
s.t. xi + δi ∈ W ∀i = 1, . . . , N
(8)
We then apply projected gradient descent to solve this con-
strained problem. At each iteration, we project the current
solution xi+δi, where δi denotes the i-th column of δ, back
intoW to ensure thatX+δ can map to a specific input word.
Group lasso Regularization: ℓ2 norm has been widely
used in the adversarial machine learning literature to mea-
sure distortions. However, it is not suitable for our task since
almost all the learned {δt}
M
t=1 using ℓ2 regularization will be
nonzero. As a result, most of the inputs words will be per-
turbed to another word, leading to an adversarial sequence
that is significantly different from the input sequence.
To solve this problem, we treat each δt with d variables as
a group, and use the group lasso regularization
R(δ) =
∑N
t=1
‖δt‖2
to enforce the group sparsity: only a few groups (words)
in the optimal solution δ∗ are allowed to be nonzero.
Gradient Regularization
When attacking the seq2seq model, it is common to find that
the adversarial example is located in a region with very few
or even no embedding vector. This will negatively affect our
projected gradient method since even the closest embedding
from those regions can be far away.
To address this issue, we propose a gradient regularization
to makeX+δ close to the word embedding space. Our final
objective function becomes:
min
δ
L(X+δ)+λ1
N∑
i=1
‖δi‖2+λ2
N∑
i=1
min
wj∈W
{
∥∥xi + δi −wj∥∥2}
s.t. xi + δi ∈W ∀i = 1, . . . , N (9)
where the third term is our gradient regularization that penal-
izes a large distance to the nearest point in W. The gradient
of this term can be efficiently computed since it is only re-
lated to one wj that has a minimum distance from xi + δi.
For the other terms, we use the proximal operator to opti-
mize the group lasso regularization, and the gradient of the
loss function L can be computed through back-propagation.
The detailed steps of our approach, Seq2Sick, is presented
in Algorithm 1. Our source code is publicly available at
https://github.com/cmhcbb/Seq2Sick.
Computational Cost: Our algorithm needs only one
back-propagation to compute the gradient ∇δL(x +
δ). The bottleneck here is to project the solution
back into the word embedding space, which depends
on the number of words in the input dictionary of
the model. Gong et al.(2018) uses GloV e word embed-
ding (Pennington, Socher, and Manning 2014) that contains
millions of words to do a nearest neighbor search. Fortu-
nately, our model does not need to use any pre-trained word
embedding, thus making it a more generic attack that does
not depend on pre-trained word embedding. Besides, we can
employ approximate nearest neighbor (ANN) approaches to
further speed up the projection step.
Experiments
We conduct experiments on two widely-used applications of
seq2seq model: text summarization and machine translation.
Datasets
We use three datasets DUC2003, DUC2004, and Giga-
word, to conduct our attack for the text summarization
task. Among them, DUC2003 and DUC2004 are widely-
used datasets in documentation summarization. We also in-
clude a subset of randomly chosen samples from Giga-
word to further evaluate the performance of our algorithm.
For the machine translation task, we use 500 samples from
WMT’16 Multimodal Translation task. The statistics about
the datasets are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Statistics of the datasets. “# Samples” is the number
of test examples we used for robustness evaluations
DATASETS # SAMPLES AVERAGE INPUT LENGTHS
GIGAWORD 1,000 30.1 WORDS
DUC2003 624 35.5 WORDS
DUC2004 500 35.6 WORDS
MULTI30K 500 11.5 WORDS
Algorithm 1 Seq2Sick algorithm
Input: input sequence x = {x1, . . . , xN}, seq2seq
model, target keyword {k1, . . . , kT }
Output: adversarial sequence x∗ = x+ δ∗
Let s = {s1, . . . , sM} denote the original output of x.
Set the loss L(·) in (9) to be (3)
if Targeted Keyword Attack then
Set the loss L(·) in (9) to be (7)
end if
for r = 1, 2, . . . , T do
back-propagationL to achieve gradient∇δL(x+ δr)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N do
δr,i = 0
if
∥∥δr,i∥∥ > ηλ1 then
δr,i = δr,i − ηλ1
δr,i
‖δr,i‖
end if
end for
yr+1 = δr + η · ∇δL(x+ δ
r)
δ
r+1 = argmin
x+δr+1∈W
∥∥∥yr+1 − δr+1∥∥∥
end for
δ
∗ = δT
x∗ = x+ δ∗
return x∗
Seq2seq models
We implement both text summarization and machine trans-
lation models on OpenNMT-py. Specifically, we use a word-
level LSTM encoder and a word-based attention decoder for
both applications (Bahdanau, Cho, and Bengio 2014). For
the text summarization task, we use 380k training pairs from
Gigaword dataset to train a seq2seq model. The architecture
consists of a 2-layer stacked LSTM with 500 hidden units.
We conduct experiments on two types of models, one uses
the pre-trained 300-dimensional GloVe word embeddings
and the other one is trained from scratch. We set the beam
search size to be 5 as suggested. For the machine translation
task, we train our model using 453k pairs from the Europal
corpus of German-English WMT 15, common crawl and
news-commentary. We use the hyper-parameters suggested
by OpenNMT for both models, and have reproduced the per-
formance reported in Rush, Chopra, and Weston(2015) and
Ha, Niehues, and Waibel(2016).
Empirical Results
Text Summarization For the non-overlapping attack, we
use the proposed loss (3) in our objective function. A non-
overlapping attack is treated as successful only if there is no
common word at every position between output sequence
and original sequence. We set λ = 1 in all non-overlapping
experiments. Table 3 summarizes the experimental results. It
shows that our algorithm only needs to change 2 or 3 words
on average and can generate entirely different outputs for
more than 80% of sentences. We have also included some
adversarial examples in Table 8. From these examples, we
can only change one word to let output sequence look com-
pletely different with the original one and change the sen-
tence’s meaning completely.
Table 3: Results of non-overlapping attack in text summa-
rization. # changed is how many words are changed in
the input sentence. The high BLEU scores and low average
number of changed words indicate that the crafted adversar-
ial inputs are very similar to their originals, and we achieve
high success rates to generate a summarization that differs
with the original at every position for all three datasets.
Dataset Success% BLEU # changed
Gigaword 86.0% 0.828 2.17
DUC2003 85.2% 0.774 2.90
DUC2004 84.2% 0.816 2.50
For the targeted keywords attack, we randomly choose
some targeted keywords from the output vocabulary after
removing the stop words like “a” and “the”. A targeted key-
words attack is treated as successful only if the output se-
quence contains all the targeted keywords. We set λ1 =
λ2 = 1 in our objective function (9) in all our experiments.
Table 4 summarizes the performance, including the over-
all success rate, average BLEU score (Papineni et al. 2002),
and the average number of changed words in input sen-
tences. Average BLEU score is defined by exponential av-
erage over BLEU 1,2,3,4, which is commonly used in eval-
uating the quality of text which has been machine-translated
from one natural language to another. Also, we have in-
cluded some adversarial examples crafted by our method in
Table 9. In Table 9, some adversarial examples with 3 sets
of keywords, where “##” stands for a two-digit number af-
ter standard preprocessing in text summarization. Through
these examples, our method could generate totally irrele-
vant subjects, verbs, numerals and objects which could eas-
ily be formed as a complete sentence with only several word
changes. Note that there are three important techniques used
in our algorithm: projected gradient method, group lasso,
and gradient regularization. Therefore, we conduct experi-
ments to verify the importance of each of these techniques.
Machine Translation We then conduct both non-
overlapping and targeted keywords attacks to the English-
German machine translation model. We first filter out stop
words like “Ein”(a), “und”(and) in German vocabulary and
randomly choose several nouns, verbs, adjectives or adverbs
in German as targeted keywords. Similar to the text summa-
rization experiments, we set λ1 = λ2 = 1 in our objective
function. The success rates, BLEU scores, and the average
number of words changed are reported in Table 5, with some
adversarial examples shown in Table 7.
Analysis of Syntactic structure and Semantic
Meaning Preservation
In our algorithm we aim to make adversarial examples hav-
ing similar meaning to original examples by constraining the
number of changed words and enforcing the changed words
Table 4: Results of targeted keywords attack in text summa-
rization. |K| is the number of keywords. We found that our
method can make the summarization include 1 or 2 target
keywords with a high success rate, while the changes made
to the input sentences are relatively small, as indicated by
the high BLEU scores and low average number of changed
words. When |K| = 3, this task becomes more challenging,
but our algorithm can still find many adversarial examples.
Datasest |K| Success% BLEU # changed
Gigaword
1 99.8% 0.801 2.04
2 96.5% 0.523 4.96
3 43.0% 0.413 8.86
DUC2003
1 99.6% 0.782 2.25
2 87.6% 0.457 5.57
3 38.3% 0.376 9.35
DUC2004
1 99.6% 0.773 2.21
2 87.8% 0.421 5.1
3 37.4% 0.340 9.3
Table 5: Results of non-overlapping method and targeted
keywords method in machine translation.
Method Success% BLEU # changed
Non-overlap 89.4% 0.349 3.5
1-keyword 100.0% 0.705 1.8
2-keyword 91.0 % 0.303 4.0
3-keyword 69.6% 0.205 5.3
are close to the original words in the embedding space. How-
ever, depending on the implemented word embedding tech-
niques, in general there is no guarantee that every word pair
close in the embedding space have similar meanings. There-
fore, we have conducted additional experiments to verify
the syntactic and semantic quality of our generated adver-
sarial examples. For syntactic structure part, as showed in
Table 6, we measure the perplexity of generated adversar-
ial sentences in DUC2003 and DUC2004 dataset. It shows
that our examples keeps the original syntactic structure. For
the semantic meaning part, We use DeepAI’s online senti-
ment analysis API to test whether our attack changes the
sentiment of 500 sentences from DUC2003 dataset in sum-
marization task. The results show that only 2.2% of adver-
sarial examples have semantic meaning differ from the
original sentences. It proves that almost all adversarial ex-
Table 6: Perplexity score for adversarial example
DUC2003 DUC2004
Original 102.02 121.09
Non-overlap 114.02 149.15
1-keyword 159.54 199.01
2-keyword 352.12 384.80
amples keep the same semantic classification unchanged.
Analysis and Discussions
Observation from adversarial example As shown in Ta-
ble 9, our targeted keyword attack wouldn’t just directly
replace the keyword with some word in the source in-
put. However, the word changed in the adversarial exam-
ple and the target keyword are co-occurrent in the train-
ing dataset. It infers that seq2seq model learns the rela-
tionship between changed word and target keyword. How-
ever, the model fails to decide where it should focus on,
which is strongly related with attention layer used in the
model. It encourages us to use self-attention such as trans-
former (Vaswani et al. 2017) instead to extract all the at-
tentions between any two words.When attacking subword
transformer model, the target 1 keyword attack has 17%
lower success rate and 0.13 lower BLEU score. It shows
transformer model has a greater adversarial robustness.
Robustness of Seq2Seq Model Although our algorithm
can achieve very good success rates (84%− 100%) in both
non-overlapping and targeted keywords attacks with 1 or 2
keywords, we also recognize some strengths of the seq2seq
model: (i) unlike CNN models where targeted attack can
be conducted easily with almost 100% success rate and
very small distortion that cannot be perceived by human
eyes (Carlini and Wagner 2017), it is harder to turn the entire
seq2seq output into a particular sentence – some sentences
are even impossible to generate by seq2seq models; and (ii)
since the input space of seq2seq is discrete, it is easier for
human to detect the differences between the adversarial se-
quence and the original one, even if we only change one or
few words. Therefore, we conclude that, compared with the
DNN models designed for other tasks such as image classi-
fication, seq2seq models are more robust to adversarial at-
tacks. The main reason, as pointed out in the introduction, is
that the seq2seq model has a finite and discrete input space
and almost infinite output space, so it is more robust than
visual classification models that have an infinite and con-
tinuous input space and a very small output space (e.g., 10
categories in MNIST and 1,000 categories in ImageNet).
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel framework, i.e., Seq2Sick,
to generate adversarial examples for sequence-to-sequence
neural network models. We propose a projected gradient
method to address the issue of discrete input space, adopt
group lasso to enforce the sparsity of the distortion, and de-
velop a regularization technique to further improve the suc-
cess rate. Besides, different from most existing algorithms
that are designed for untargeted attack and classification
tasks, our algorithm can perform the more challenging tar-
geted keywords attack. Our experimental results show that
the proposed framework is powerful and effective: it can
achieve high success rates in both non-overlapping and tar-
geted keywords attacks with relatively small distortions and
preserve similar sentiment classification results for the most
of the generated adversarial examples.
Table 7: Machine translation adversarial examples. Upper 4 lines: non-overlap; Bottom 4 lines: targeted keyword ”Hund sitzt”
Source input seq A child is splashing in the water.
Adv input seq A children is unionists in the water.
Source output seq Ein Kind im Wasser.
Adv output seq Kinder sind in der Wasser @-@ <unk>.
Source input seq Two men wearing swim trunks jump in the air at a moderately populated beach.
Adv input seq Two men wearing dog Leon comes in the air at a moderately populated beach.
Source output seq Zwei Mnner in Badehosen springen auf einem mig belebten Strand in die Luft.
Adv output seq Zwei Mnner tragen Hund , der in der Luft sitzt , hat <unk> <unk> .
Table 8: Text summarization adversarial examples using non-overlappingmethod. Surprisingly, it is possible to make the output
sequence completely different by changing only one word in the input sequence.
Source input seq among asia ’s leaders , prime minister mahathir mohamad was notable as a man with a bold vision :
a physical and social transformation that would push this nation into the forefront of world affairs .
Adv input seq among lynn ’s leaders , prime minister mahathir mohamad was notable as a man with a bold vision
: a physical and social transformation that would push this nation into the forefront of world affairs.
Source output seq asia ’s leaders are a man of the world
Adv output seq a vision for the world
Source input seq under nato threat to end his punishing offensive against ethnic albanian separatists in kosovo , presi-
dent slobodan milosevic of yugoslavia has ordered most units of his army back to their barracks and
may well avoid an attack by the alliance , military observers and diplomats say
Adv input seq under nato threat to end his punishing offensive against ethnic albanian separatists in kosovo , pres-
ident slobodan milosevic of yugoslavia has jean-sebastien most units of his army back to their
barracks and may well avoid an attack by the alliance , military observers and diplomats say.
Source output seq milosevic orders army back to barracks
Adv output seq nato may not attack kosovo
Source input seq flooding on the yangtze river remains serious although water levels on parts of the river decreased
today , according to the state headquarters of flood control and drought relief .
Adv input seq flooding that the yangtze river becomes serious although water levels on parts of the river decreased
today , according to the state headquarters of flood control and drought relief .
Source output seq floods on yangtze river continue
Adv output seq flooding in water recedes in river
Table 9: Text summarization examples with targeted keywords “police arrest ”
Source input seq north korea is entering its fourth winter of chronic food shortages with its people malnourished and
at risk of dying from normally curable illnesses , senior red cross officials said tuesday.
Adv input seq north detectives is apprehended its fourth winter of chronic food shortages with its people malnour-
ished and at risk of dying from normally curable illnesses , senior red cross officials said tuesday.
Source output seq north korea enters fourth winter of food shortages
Adv output seq north police arrest fourth winter of food shortages.
Source input seq after a day of fighting , congolese rebels said sunday they had entered kindu , the strategic town and
airbase in eastern congo used by the government to halt their advances.
Adv input seq after a day of fighting , nordic detectives said sunday they had entered UNK , the strategic town and
airbase in eastern congo used by the government to halt their advances.
Source output seq congolese rebels say they have entered UNK.
Adv output seq nordic police arrest ## in congo.
Source input seq president boris yeltsin stayed home tuesday , nursing a respiratory infection that forced him to cut
short a foreign trip and revived concerns about his ability to govern.
Adv input seq president boris yeltsin stayed home tuesday , cops cops respiratory infection that forced him to cut
short a foreign trip and revived concerns about his ability to govern.
Source output seq yeltsin stays home after illness
Adv output seq yeltsin stays home after police arrest
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